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Abstract 
Suppose that an altruistic agent who is uncertain between evidential and causal                       
decision theory finds herself in a situation where these theories give conflicting                       
verdicts. We argue that even if she has significantly higher credence in CDT, she                           
should nevertheless act in accordance with EDT. First, we claim that the appropriate                         
response to normative uncertainty is to hedge one’s bets. That is, if the stakes are much                               
higher on one theory than another, and the credences you assign to each of these                             
theories aren’t very different, then it’s appropriate to choose the option which                       
performs best on the high-stakes theory. Second, we show that, given the assumption                         
of altruism, the existence of correlated decision-makers will increase the stakes for EDT                         
but leave the stakes for CDT unaffected. Together these two claims imply that                         
whenever there are sufficiently many correlated agents, the appropriate response is to                       





Suppose you find yourself in the following decision situation: 
1 For discussion and feedback, we are grateful to Christian Tarsney, Hayden Wilkinson, and an anonymous referee. 
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 Moral Newcomb 
In front of you are two boxes, A and B. You can choose either B only, or both A and B.                                         
Box A is guaranteed to contain one dose of a cure for a fatal disease, whereas box B                                   
may or may not contain ten such doses. A highly reliable predictor has made a                             
prediction about your decision. If she predicted that you would take both boxes, she                           
left box B empty. If she predicted that you would take box B only, she put ten doses in                                     
that box. What should you do? 
 
Cases like this give rise to the well-known debate between causal decision theory (CDT) and                             
evidential decision theory (EDT). Roughly speaking, according to CDT, you should perform the                         
action which is likely to ​cause a good outcome, whereas according to EDT, you should perform the                                 
action which ​provides strong evidence​ that a good outcome will occur.   2
 




2 More precisely, CDT tells you to perform the action with the highest ​causal expected value (CEV), where the CEV of an                                           
action A is the sum product of the value of each outcome and the probability that A causes that outcome. By contrast,                                           
EDT tells you to perform the action with the highest ​evidential expected value (EEV), where the EEV of an action A is the                                             
sum product of the value of each outcome and the probability of that outcome on the assumption that A is performed. 
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   Cure in both  Cure in one only 
Take one box  Ten lives  Nothing 
Take both boxes  Eleven lives  One life  
 
Given that the prediction has already been made, your decision has no influence on whether or not                                 
box B contains anything. Therefore, CDT recommends that you choose both boxes, because that way                             
you are guaranteed to obtain one more dose than you otherwise would, regardless of whether or not B                                   
is empty. By contrast, EDT recommends that you choose only choose box B, because you would                               
thereby receive strong evidence that you will obtain ten doses of the cure. If you instead choose both                                   
boxes, you would thereby receive strong evidence that you will merely obtain one dose. CDT has                               
garnered more adherents (Bourget and Chalmers, 2014), and hence we assume most decision theorists                           
believe that you should two-box in the ​Moral Newcomb problem. But here’s an argument for                             
one-boxing that, to our knowledge, has not appeared in the literature. The argument relies on three                               
premises. 
 
First, even though one might have higher credence in CDT than EDT, there is still an ongoing debate,                                   
and a number of intelligent and well-informed decision theorists endorse EDT. In the face of such                               
expert disagreement, one shouldn’t be anywhere near certain that CDT is correct. Instead, one should                             
assign at least some credence to EDT. Second, once we take into account our background knowledge                               
of the world, the stakes become significantly higher for EDT than CDT in the ​Moral Newcomb                               
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problem. The universe is probably very big indeed, and there are very many individuals very similar to                                 
you who will face similar decision problems. As a result of this similarity, your decision in the ​Moral                                   
Newcomb problem is correlated with decisions made by many other agents elsewhere in time and space.                               
This means that the simple state-consequence matrix above does not in fact capture everything that is                               
relevant to the decision problem: we have to refine the state space so that it also describes whether or                                     
not correlated agents face boxes with cures in both. By taking one box, you gain evidence not only that                                     
you will obtain more doses of the cure, but also that these other agents will achieve good outcomes                                   
too. Therefore, the existence of correlated agents has the effect of increasing the stakes for EDT. By                                 
contrast, there is no causal connection between your decision and the decision of these other agents,                               
and hence taking them into account does not affect the stakes for CDT. Third, in the face of                                   
uncertainty, the rational thing to do is to hedge one’s bets. If the stakes are much higher on one                                     
hypothesis than another, and the credences you assign to each of these hypotheses aren’t very different,                               
then it’s rational to choose the option which performs best on the high-stakes hypothesis.  
 
If these three premises are true, then one-boxing is the rational thing to do in the ​Moral Newcomb                                   
problem. But, for an altruistic and morally motivated agent, there’s nothing special about ​Moral                           
Newcomb compared to other decision problems where EDT and CDT disagree. So we can generalise                             
our conclusion as follows:   
 
In general, and across a wide variety of decision contexts, if you are an altruistic and                               
morally motivated agent, and are uncertain between EDT and CDT, you should                       
typically act in line with EDT even if you have significantly higher credence in CDT. 
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 Call this argument ​The Evidentialist’s Wager​. 
 
Should we accept the Wager? There are several steps of the argument that can be questioned. First, one                                   
could debate whether you ought to hedge in the face of decision-theoretic uncertainty. While this is                               
not the primary focus of this article, we will give some motivation for hedging in the next section.                                   
Second, in order for the claim that the stakes are higher for EDT than for CDT to be meaningful, we                                       
need some way of making an intertheoretic value comparison — that is, some way of comparing the                                 
magnitude of an action’s evidential expected value with the magnitude of its causal expected value. We                               
present a proposal for doing this in section 3. Third, one might wonder whether we should really                                 
expect the world to contain sufficiently many correlated decision-makers facing similar decision                       
problems. We will address this question in section 4. One way for there to be many such agents is if the                                         
universe is infinite, as is implied by several leading cosmological theories. But the infinite case gives rise                                 
to a range of further issues. These are addressed in section 5. 
 
Although we have presented the Wager as applying to agents who are uncertain between EDT and                               
CDT, its scope is in fact wider than this. It applies equally well to agents who are uncertain between                                     
CDT and other non-causal decision theories, such as the recently developed ​functional decision theory​,                           
or FDT. For our purposes, the relevant features of EDT are (i) that it sometimes disagrees with CDT,                                   3
3 For formulations of functional decision theory, see Soares and Levinstein (forthcoming), Yudkowsky and Soares (2017),                               
and Greene and Levinstein (manuscript). Further arguments in favour of FDT and some related theories are given in                                   
Greene.  
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and (ii) that in some of those cases it is sensitive to non-causal correlations between decision makers.                                 
FDT shares both of these features, and our argument therefore provides reason for altruistic and                             
morally motivated agents who are uncertain between CDT and FDT to follow the latter as well.  
 
 
2  Arguments for Hedging 
 
The Wager relies crucially on the idea that, in the face of decision-theoretic uncertainty, one ought to                                 
hedge. But is that correct? Perhaps what one ought to do is just what one ought to do according to the                                         
correct first-order decision theory? We’re not going to be able to resolve this question in this article.                                 
But we’ll show that although the view has its issues to resolve, there are some significant arguments in                                   
its favour and it should therefore at least be taken seriously. We present three such arguments.  
 
2.1  Dominance 
Consider the following variant on Newcomb’s problem. 
 
Almost Equal Amounts 
In front of you are two boxes, A and B. You can choose either B only, or both A and B.                                         
Box A is guaranteed to contain $0.98M, whereas box B may or may not contain $1M.                               
A 99% reliable predictor has made a prediction about your decision. If she predicted                           
that you would take both boxes, she left box B empty. If she instead predicted that you                                 
would take box B only, she put $1M in that box. 
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   Money in both  Money in one only 
Take one box  $1M  $0 
Take both boxes  $1.98M  $0.98M 
 
In this case, the evidential expected value of taking both boxes is the same as that of taking one box                                       
only, whereas the causal expected value of taking both boxes is $0.98M greater than that of taking one                                   
box only. Suppose now that you have 90% credence in EDT and only 10% credence in CDT. From                                   4
the perspective of EDT, you have nothing to lose by two-boxing, whereas from the perspective of                               
CDT, you have $0.98M to lose by one-boxing. In short, two-boxing state-wise (or ‘theory-wise’)                           
dominates one-boxing. Thus it seems clear that you should two-box, in at least some sense of ‘should’.   5
 
In ​Almost Equal Amounts​, EDT is indifferent between the two actions and CDT prefers one over the                                 
other. But we can also construct a case where CDT is indifferent between the two actions and EDT                                   
prefers one over the other. Consider: 
 
Empty Box 
4 EEV(A&B) = 0.01 × $1.98M + 0.99 × $0.98M = $0.99M and EEV(B) = 0.99 × $1M + 0.01 × $0 = $0.99M.  
5 For discussions of different senses of ‘should’ in the context of moral uncertainty, see for example MacAskill, Bykvist and                                       
Ord (2019, chapter 1) and Sepielli (2010, chapter 1). 
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In front of you are two boxes, A and B. You can choose either B only, or both A and B.                                         
Box A is guaranteed to be empty, whereas box B may or may not contain $1M. A 99%                                   
reliable predictor has made a prediction about your decision. If she predicted that you                           
would take both boxes, she left box B empty. If she instead predicted that you would                               
take box B only, she put $1M in that box. 
 
  Money in B  Both empty 
Take one box  $1M  $0 
Take both boxes  $1M  $0 
 
In this case, the situation is reversed: the causal expected value of taking both boxes is the same as that                                       
of taking one box only, whereas the evidential expected value of taking one box only is $0.98M greater                                   
than that of taking both boxes. Suppose now that you have 90% credence in CDT and only 10%                                   6
credence in EDT. From the perspective of CDT, you have nothing to lose by one-boxing, whereas                               
from the perspective of EDT, you have $0.98M to lose by two-boxing. In short, one-boxing dominates                               
two- boxing. So it seems clear that you should one-box. 
 
But suppose now that the right thing to do in the face of decision-theoretic uncertainty is simply to                                   
follow the recommendation of the correct (first-order) decision theory. If EDT is correct, you should                             
be indifferent between the two actions in ​Almost Equal Amounts​, and one-box in ​Empty Box​. If CDT                                 
6 EEV(A&B) = ​0.01 × $1M + ​0.99 ​× $0  = $0.01M and EEV(B) = 0.99 × $1M + 0.01 × $0 = $0.99M. 
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is correct, you should two-box in ​Almost Equal Amounts​, and be indifferent in ​Empty Box​. Hence                               
neither of the two theories can make sense of the intuition that one should two-box in ​Almost Equal                                   
Amounts and one-box in ​Empty Box​. By contrast, if there is some notion of ought which is sensitive to                                     
all decision theories one has positive credence in, these suggestions make perfectly good sense. 
 
2.2 Stakes Sensitivity 
MacAskill (2016) argues that our intuitions in Newcomb cases are sensitive to the relative stakes for                               
EDT and CDT, and that this stakes sensitivity can be explained by the fact that one should hedge                                   
under decision-theoretic uncertainty. , He presents the following two cases (slightly altered here) in                         7 8
support of this conclusion: 
 
High-Stakes Predictor I (HSP-I) 
Box A is opaque; Box B, transparent. If the Predictor predicted that you choose Box A                               
only, then she put a million doses of the cure for a fatal disease in Box A. If she                                     
7 ​More specifically, MacAskill argues that this stakes sensitivity is explained by the fact that, in the face of decision-theoretic                                      
uncertainty, one should follow ​Meta Decision Theory (MDT), and choose the option with the highest ​meta expected value​,                                   
where the meta expected value of an option is given as the sum, for each first-order decision theory, of the option’s value                                           
according to the decision theory, weighted by one’s credence in that decision theory. MDT entails, but is not entailed by,                                       
the claim that one should hedge. Nozick (1993:45) also notes this stakes sensitivity but goes on to propose that both EDT                                         
and CDT have genuine normative force, and that the weights we assign them should measure their relative normative                                   
force, rather than quantify our credences in them.  
8 The dominance argument above can be seen as a special case of such stakes sensitivity, where there’s something at stake for                                           
one theory but not for the other. 
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predicted that you choose both Box A and Box B, then she put nothing into Box A.                                 
Box B—transparent to you—contains a stick of gum. You have two options only:                         
Choose Box A, or choose both Box A and Box B. 
 
  Cure  in both  Cure  in one only 
Take one box  1,000,000 lives  Nothing 
Take both boxes  1,000,000 lives + gum  Gum 
 
In HSP-I, intuitively you should one-box, because the stakes seem much greater for EDT. For CDT,                               
the decision between one-boxing and two-boxing is merely a choice of whether or not to get a stick of                                     
gum. By contrast, for EDT the decision is about whether or not to save a million lives. But consider                                     
now:  
 
High-Stakes Predictor II (HSP-II) 
Box C is opaque; Box D, transparent. If the Predictor predicted that you choose Box C                               
only, then she put a million doses of the cure for a fatal disease into Box C and also a                                       
stick of gum. If she predicted that you choose both Box C and Box D, then she put                                   
nothing into Box C. Box D—transparent to you—also contains a million doses of the                           
cure for a fatal disease. However, Box D contains no gum. One has two options only:                               
Choose Box C only, or both Box C and Box D. 
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   Cure in both  Cure in one only 
Take one box  1,000,000 lives + gum  Nothing 
Take both boxes  2,000,000 lives + gum  1,000,000 lives 
 
In HSP-II, intuitively you should two-box, because the stakes seem much greater for CDT. Here the                               
situation is reversed: for EDT, the decision between one-boxing and two-boxing is merely a choice of                               
whether or not to get a stick of gum. By contrast, for CDT the decision is about whether or not to save                                           
a million lives. 
 
However, in both HSP-I and HSP-II, the evidential expected value of one-boxing is greater than that                               
of two-boxing, and the causal expected value of two-boxing is greater than that of one-boxing. Again,                               
if there is no sense of ‘ought’ which is relative to one’s decision-theoretic uncertainty, we cannot                               
account for these verdicts.  
 
What’s more, as MacAskill argues, the standard intuitions about the existing most influential                         
decision-theoretic thought experiments—​Standard Newcomb, The Smoking Lesion​, and ​The                 
Psychopath Button​—can also be explained in terms of the idea that we are intuitively hedging in the                                 
face of decision-theoretic uncertainty. And it seems that, empirically, people’s intuitions about                       
Newcomb problems are stakes sensitive: in a study that we and some coauthors ran, subjects were                               
more likely to one-box in Newcomb’s problem if the stakes were higher for EDT than for CDT.                                 
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Insofar as accordance with people’s intuitions in these cases has been taken to be a desideratum of a                                   
decision theory, this provides some support for the idea that, in some sense of ‘ought’, one ought to                                   
hedge in the face of decision-theoretic uncertainty. 
 
2.3 Paying for Information 
Consider again the ​Moral Newcomb ​problem with which we started. Suppose that before making up                             
your mind, you learn that, via a time machine, a book has been delivered from the year 10,000 CE. On                                       
the blurb it claims that after long reflection our descendants have discovered the correct decision                             
theory, with arguments so clear and compelling that anyone can understand and everyone will be                             
convinced. It even has various applications of the view, including to the precise problem you’re facing.                               
However, you have to pay $5 in order to read the book. 
 
Let’s bracket, for the purpose of this example, any intrinsic value from knowledge of the truth about                                 
rationality, any fame that the reader might receive for explaining its arguments to others, and so on: we                                   
can imagine that you know you will immediately forget the contents of the book after making your                                 
decision. If there is no sense of ‘ought’ which is relative to one’s decision-theoretic uncertainty, you                               
should not buy and read the book. From EDT’s perspective, paying $5 to read the book and then                                   
one-boxing is strictly worse than just one-boxing right away. Similarly, from CDT’s perspective,                         
paying $5 to read the book and then two-boxing is strictly worse than just two-boxing right away. So,                                   
if you ought to do simply what you ought to do on the correct decision theory, you ought not to pay                                         
the $5 to read the book. 
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This seems deeply counterintuitive: given the stakes—ten lives saved for EDT and one life saved for                               
CDT—it would seem reckless not to incur such a trivial cost before taking action. But if so, there is                                     
some notion of ‘ought’ which is relative to one’s decision-theoretic uncertainty. 
 
2.4 Outstanding Issues 
The argument from stakes-sensitivity supports the claim that one should hedge in the face of                             
decision-theoretic uncertainty, whereas the other two arguments only support the weaker claim that                         
there is some notion of ‘ought’ that takes decision-theoretic uncertainty into account. However, it                           
seems clear to us that if one accepts that there is such a notion of ‘ought’, one should plausibly accept                                       
hedging as well. In the context of moral uncertainty, most of the resistance to hedging from those who                                   
accept the relevant notion of ‘ought’ is driven by skepticism about the possibility of intertheoretic                             
value comparisons (e.g. Gustafsson and Torpman 2014:165). But as we will argue in the next section,                               
such comparisons are significantly easier to make in the case of decision-theoretic uncertainty.  
 
Nevertheless, the view that one should hedge under decision-theoretic uncertainty still faces some                         
outstanding issues. In order to know precisely how to take (first-order) decision-theoretic uncertainty                         
into account, one needs a second-order decision theory. Although we have not presented a specific                             
second-order decision theory, we have argued that any plausible account should endorse hedging;                         
candidate second-order decision theories would include ‘meta causal decision theory’ and ‘meta                       
evidential decision theory’ (MacAskill 2016). However, if one should be uncertain among first-order                         
decision theories, one should presumably also be uncertain among second-order decision theories.                       
Moreover, if uncertainty among first-order decision theories can make a difference for what one                           
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should do, then presumably so can uncertainty among second-order decision theories. In order to take                             
this uncertainty into account we need a third-order decision theory, and thus we are seemingly lead                               
into an infinite regress of uncertainty at higher and higher orders. This infinite regress represents a                               
significant challenge to the claim that one should hedge in the face of first-order decision-theoretic                             
uncertainty. If we could somehow be certain that the correct second-order decision theory—whatever                         
it is—endorses hedging, then we would be in the clear. But we should not assign zero credence to ​My                                     
Favourite Theory​, according to which one should simply act in accordance with the first-order theory                             
one has highest credence in, and which therefore does not endorse hedging. We recognise that this is a                                   9
major challenge, but for the purposes of this paper we will assume that some solution can be obtained.                                 
 10
 
A second challenge concerns the question of what notion of ‘ought’ is at play in the claim that one                                     
ought to hedge under decision-theoretic uncertainty. In the corresponding literature on moral                       11
uncertainty, one common strategy is to say that although the notion of ‘ought’ that is provided by the                                   
correct moral theory is a moral ought, the notion of ‘ought’ that is relative to one’s moral uncertainty                                   
is a rational ought. However, on the face of it, this strategy appears to be unavailable in the present                                     12
context. The ought which is relative to the correct (first-order) decision theory is already a rational                               
9 See Gustafsson and Torpman (2014) for a discussion and defence of ​My Favourite Theory in the context of moral                                       
uncertainty.  
10 ​For detailed discussion of the regress problem, see Trammell (2019), MacAskill, Ord, and Bykvist (2019, chapter 1.3),                                  
and Tarsney (manuscript). 
11 See Weatherson (2014), Harman (2015) and Hedden (2016) for this objection in the context of moral uncertainty. 
12 See Sepielli (2013) and MacAskill, Ord, and Bykvist (forthcoming) for further discussion. 
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ought, and therefore it seems we cannot appeal to that distinction here. Again, we shall not try to                                   13
resolve this issue here.  
 
For these two reasons, we think it’s an open question whether you ought to hedge in the face of                                     
decision-theoretic uncertainty: whichever view you take, you have some hard problems to grapple                         
with. However, we believe the arguments we’ve given in favour of hedging make the idea that one                                 
should hedge sufficiently plausible that it’s interesting and important to work out what one should do                               
if one should hedge. In what follows, we will therefore assess the conditional claim that if you ought                                     




In order for the claim that one ought to hedge in the face of decision-theoretic uncertainty to be                                   
meaningful, we must have some way of comparing evidential expected value with causal expected                           
value. Otherwise we will not be able to make sense of the claim that the stakes are higher for EDT than                                         
they are for CDT. In the literature on moral uncertainty, this is known as the problem of                                 
intertheoretic value comparisons. To get a sense of the difficulty of this problem, consider the                             
13 However, if we think of supplementing a given axiology with either an evidential or a causal decision principle as giving                                         
rise to two distinct moral theories, we can still appeal to this distinction. As an analogy, consider the fact that a utilitarian                                           
axiology can be combined with both a risk-neutral and a risk-averse principle for evaluating actions under empirical                                 
uncertainty. If we think of risk-neutral and risk-averse utilitarianism as two distinct moral theories, then we should                                 
plausibly say the same thing about evidential and causal utilitarianism. Of course, this maneuver will not work for all cases                                       
of uncertainty between EDT and CDT. 
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following case. Suppose that you’re facing the ​Footbridge trolley problem, but your credence is evenly                             
split between a consequentialist theory and a deontological theory. If you should hedge under moral                             
uncertainty then you should sacrifice the one in order to save the five if the stakes are higher for the                                       
consequentialist theory, and refrain from doing so if the stakes are higher for the deontological theory.                               
But how are you to put the two theories on a common scale in order to know whether the stakes are                                         
higher for the consequentialist or the deontological theory? The theories themselves do not seem to                             
come equipped with an answer to this question, and it’s hard to see what other information one could                                   
appeal to in order to resolve it. Multiple proposals have been made in the literature, but it’s clear that                                     
there is not yet any consensus solution.   14
 
Luckily, the problem of intertheoretic comparisons is significantly easier in the case of                         
decision-theoretic uncertainty. In order to see this, let us first state EDT and CDT more precisely.                               
According to EDT, you should choose the action with the highest evidential expected value (EEV) ,                               
calculated as follows: 
EV (A) (O  | A)V (O ),E = ∑
n
i=1
P i EDT i  
 
where ​O​1​, ..., ​O​n ​are the possible outcomes, P is the agent’s credence function, and V​EDT is her value                                     
function. The EEV of an action ​A is the sum product of the value of each outcome and the                                     
probability of that outcome on the assumption that ​A is performed. According to CDT, by contrast,                               
you should choose the action with the highest causal expected value (CEV), calculated as follows: 
14 ​For discussion of intertheoretic comparisons in the case of moral uncertainty, see Sepielli (2009, 2010), MacAskill (2014,                                  
chapter 4), Tarsney (2018), and MacAskill, Ord and Bykvist (2019, chapter 5).  
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 EV (A) (A )V (O ),C =  ∑
n
i=1
P ⇒ Oi CDT i    
 
where ​A ⇒ O​i ​denotes the counterfactual conditional “if I were to do ​A​, then ​O​i would occur.” The                                     
CEV of an action ​A is the sum product of the value of each outcome and the probability that ​A causes                                         
that outcome. Thus EDT and CDT are both versions of the claim that one should maximise expected                                 
value. They only disagree on how this expectation is to be calculated: according to EDT, one should                                 
use the conditional probability, whereas according to CDT, one should use the probability of the                             
counterfactual conditional.  
 
This observation suggests a natural procedure for intertheoretic value comparisons. If the                       
disagreement between EDT and CDT only concerns which type of probability should be used to                             
calculate expected value, then we should not construe them as having different value functions.                           
Intuitively, a decision theory does not prescribe that you value outcomes in some particular way.                             
Instead, it tells you how to act in light of the values (and beliefs) you in fact hold. Therefore, we will                                         
argue that the problem of intertheoretic value comparisons is solved by requiring that V​EDT = V​CDT​. By                                 
imposing this condition we place the two theories on a common scale, thereby rendering intertheoretic                             
value comparisons straightforward. To determine whether the stakes are higher for EDT or CDT in                             
the ​Moral Newcomb ​problem, we simply calculate all expected values with respect to the shared value                               
function and then compare the two quantities EEV(​One-box​) – EEV(​Two-box​) and CEV(​Two-box​) –                         
CEV(​One-box​). Moreover, this proposal has the desirable implication that the evidential and causal                         
expected value of an action ​A will only differ if there is some outcome ​O such that P(​O | ​A​) ≠ P(​A ​⇒                                             
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O​). That is, they only differ in those cases where one would intuitively expect EDT and CDT to come                                     
apart. 
 
This proposal might seem obvious to some but to argue for it we must first say a bit more about the                                         
nature of value functions in decision theory. For our purposes, there are two salient ways of thinking                                 
about these value functions. First, we can think of them as externally given, and therefore independent                               
of the choice of a particular decision theory. Second, we can think of them as constructed, via a                                   
representation theorem, from the agent’s relational attitude. Let us begin with the former. Given that                             
we presented the Wager as an argument for why ​altruistic and morally motivated agents should                             
generally favour EDT in the face of decision-theoretic uncertainty, it is natural to think of the value                                 
functions as being externally provided by some moral theory. In particular, suppose that the agent                             
facing the ​Moral Newcomb ​problem is certain of some axiology, and that she does not take there to be                                     
any relevant side constraints: in deciding whether to one-box or two-box, she simply wants to perform                               
the action that in expectation leads to the best outcome according to her favoured axiology. The only                                 
thing she’s uncertain about is how she should take into account information about causation and                             
correlation when making her decision. In this case it is clear that she does not face a problem of                                     
intertheoretic comparisons, because both V​CDT​ and V​EDT​ are given by the relevant axiology.  
 
The same point holds if she is instead acting under axiological uncertainty. If she has settled on some                                   
value function V which represents the value she assigns to outcomes in light of her axiological                               
uncertainty (for example, V might be the expected value of the outcome under axiological                           
uncertainty), then this is the value function that should be used to calculate both causal and evidential                                 
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expected value. Again, if it were the case that V​CDT ≠ V​EDT​, then at least one of the two would not                                         
accurately represent how she values states of affairs under axiological uncertainty. In general, if there is                               
some externally given value function over outcomes, there will not be any problem of intertheoretic                             
comparisons to begin with.  
 
But suppose that there isn’t any externally given value function. A second approach is to say that the                                   
value functions are constructed (along with the corresponding probability functions) via a                       
representation theorem from the agent’s relational attitudes, typically her preferences over options. A                         
representation theorem shows that if an agent’s preferences over options satisfy certain conditions,                         
then she can be represented as maximising expected value with respect to some probability function P                               
and some value function V, in the sense that for any pair of options ​A and ​B​, she prefers ​A to ​B just in                                               
case the expected value of ​A is greater than the expected value of ​B (with the expected value calculated                                     
relative to P and V).  
 
Suppose therefore that both V​EDT and V​CDT​, along with their respective probability functions P​EDT and                             
P​CDT​, are constructed via representation theorems. In order to compare them, we need a framework                             
which is broad enough to be able to express both EDT and CDT. This means that, for our purposes,                                     
the most relevant result is Joyce’s (1999:239) very general representation theorem, which can                         
underwrite both evidential and causal decision theory. Joyce takes as his starting point both a                             
preference relation and a comparative belief relation. Both of these relations are ​conditional (or                           
suppositional​) in the sense that they are defined over options of the form ‘​A on the condition that ​B​.’                                     
For example, I might prefer going for a walk on the supposition that its sunny to staying inside reading                                     
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on the supposition that it rains, or I might find rain on the supposition that it’s cloudy more likely                                     
than a breeze on the supposition that it’s sunny. 
 
Joyce imposes requirements on both the preference relation and the comparative belief relation which                           
together ensure the existence of a unique probability function and a unique (up to positive linear                               
transformation) value function. By imposing further conditions on the comparative belief relation so                         
as to make the supposition behave either like evidential or causal supposition, he is able to derive both                                   
EDT and CDT as special cases. Now, if we take the relevant preferences and comparative beliefs to be                                   
the ones that the agent in fact has, then we cannot construct both V​CDT and V​EDT simultaneously.                                 
After all, if she satisfies the conditions needed for EDT she will fail to satisfy the conditions needed for                                     
CDT. But we can proceed as follows. In order to construct a cardinal value function, it is sufficient to                                     
consider the agent’s preferences and comparative beliefs on just a single supposition. So all we have to                                 
do is find a proposition such that the preferences and comparative beliefs of EDT are in agreement                                 
with those of CDT on the supposition that this proposition is true. And here a natural candidate                                 
suggests itself: the tautology. Evidential and causal supposition will not yield different constraints on                           
preferences and comparative beliefs when the proposition being supposed is the tautology. This                         15
allows us to say that EDT and CDT share the same value function.  16
15 The only case in which this would not work is if there is some proposition ​A such that P(​A | ⊤) = P(⊤⇒​A​) = 0, yet some                                                       
other proposition ​B​ such that P(​B ​⇒ ​A​) > 0. 
16 More generally, Joyce (1999:178) concedes that Jeffrey’s (1983) evidential decision theory has the correct account of                                 
value (“desirability”) and argues that causal expected utility is simply desirability from the perspective of the supposition                                 
that an act will be performed. The same sentiment is expressed by Bradley (2017:170). Again, these claims indicate that an                                       
agent’s value function should not depend on which decision theory she takes to be correct. 
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 In summary, either there is an externally given value function, for example one provided by an                               
axiology, or the value functions of EDT and CDT are constructed via representation theorems. In the                               
former case, we can straightforwardly conclude that V​EDT = V​CDT​. In the latter case, we can use Joyce’s                                   
general representation theorem to construct both value functions, thereby ensuring that they are in                           
agreement with one another. 
 
You might object that our proposal about how to make intertheoretic value comparisons ‘stacks the                             
deck’ in favour of EDT because, as the evidentialist’s wager shows, in general under decision-theoretic                             
uncertainty, with this choice of intertheoretic comparisons, one will act in accordance with EDT’s                           
recommendation. As an analogy, consider the question of how to do intertheoretic value comparisons                           
between average and total utilitarianism. Suppose we fix such comparisons by stipulating that in a                             
world with only one individual, the difference in value between any two actions is the same for average                                   
and total utilitarianism. This implies that in a world with ​n individuals, giving each of them one                                 
additional unit of welfare would be ​n times more valuable according to total utilitarianism than                             
according to average utilitarianism. In effect, this means that total utilitarianism will swamp average                           
utilitarianism: if one should hedge under moral uncertainty, then one will generally go with total                             
rather than average utilitarianism whenever they are in conflict, because the stakes are much higher for                               
the former theory. It has been argued that this is a good reason for thinking that we should not make                                       
the intertheoretic comparisons between average and total utilitarianism in this way. Perhaps using                         17
V​EDT = V​CDT to settle comparisons between EDT and CDT is analogous to using the one-person                               
17 See for example Hedden (2016) and Cotton-Barratt, MacAskill and Ord (forthcoming). 
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world to settle comparisons between total and average utilitarianism, and should be rejected for the                             
same reason. 
 
However, the analogy is flawed. When normalising average and total utilitarianism at the one-person                           
world, there are no scenarios in which the stakes are higher for average utilitarianism than for total                                 
utilitarianism. By contrast, using the case of no non-causal correlations to normalise does allow for                             
scenarios in which the stakes are higher for CDT than for EDT, as the following example shows. 
 
Evil Twin 
In front of you are two boxes, A and B. You can choose either B only, or both A and B.                                         
Box A is guaranteed to contain ten thousand dollars to be donated to an effective                             
charity, whereas box B may or may not contain twenty thousand dollars to be donated                             
to an effective charity. A 99% reliable predictor has made a prediction about your                           
decision. If she predicted that you would take both boxes, she left box B empty. If she                                 
predicted that you would take box B only, she put twenty thousand in that box.                             
However, you also know that your evil twin is facing the same decision problem. Being                             
evil, he will donate the money to an anti-charity. One dollar to the anti-charity                           
precisely counterbalances one dollar to the charity. However, all of the monetary                       
amounts in his decision problem are half the size of yours. Being your twin, his                             
decision is perfectly correlated with your own. 
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For CDT, the fact that your evil twin also faces a similar decision problem makes no difference to the                                     
stakes: CEV(Two-box) – CEV(One-box) = $10,000. But for EDT, it means that the stakes are half as                                 
big as they would otherwise have been: EEV(One-box) – EEV(Two-box) = $4,800. Hence our                           
proposal for how to do intertheoretic comparisons, when combined with a claim about correlations,                           
now yields the result that the stakes are lower for EDT than for CDT, rather than the other way                                     
around. Therefore, it is not true that our account makes EDT swamp CDT in general. Whether or not                                   




We have argued (or at least attempted to make plausible) that it is rational to hedge in the face of                                       
decision-theoretic uncertainty. That is, we have argued that even if your credence in CDT is                             
substantially higher, you should nevertheless follow EDT if the stakes are much higher for EDT. We                               
have also presented an account of intertheoretic comparisons that allows us to say when the stakes are                                 
higher for one decision theory than another. Together, these imply that if the expected number of                               
correlated decision-makers is large enough, you should one-box in the ​Moral Newcomb problem even                           
if you have significantly higher credence in CDT than in EDT. Recall that the possible payoffs are as                                   
follows: 
 
  Cure in both  Cure in one only 
Take one box  Ten lives  Nothing 
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Take both boxes  Eleven lives  One life 
 
Suppose that the predictor is 99% reliable. This means that, before taking any correlated agents into                               
account, the stakes are 8.8 times higher for evidential than for causal decision theory. Suppose now                               
that you have merely 1% credence in EDT, and 99% credence in CDT. If we were then trying to                                     
maximise expected value over decision-theoretic uncertainty, the existence of correlated agents would                       
have to increase the relative stakes for EDT by a factor of 11.25 in order for one-boxing to be the                                       
rational option. 
 
Why should one expect there to be all these correlated agents facing ​Moral Newcomb problems? Our                               
argument doesn’t require that the correlation in question be perfect. Consider now the vast number of                               
humans and similarly reasoning aliens that could exist in the future. For example, Bostrom (2013:18)                             
estimates that over the course of the future, Earth could sustain 10​16 lives of normal duration. If we                                   
instead assume that we will at some point spread beyond Earth, or that life will eventually be primarily                                   
digital, he gives the corresponding estimates of 10​34 and 10​54 life years respectively. Probably, some of                               
these future people will be similar to you in terms of how they approach Newcomblike problems.                               
Therefore, your decision to one-box constitutes evidence that they will also one-box. Of course, the                             
evidence isn’t perfect, but if the number of correlated agents is sufficiently large, the impact will be the                                   
same as that of many identical copies. For example, if your decision to one-box only increased the                                 
probability that the correlated agents one-box by 1%, there would only have to be 1025 agents who are                                   
facing problems similar to ​Moral Newcomb ​and who are correlated at this level in order for hedging to                                   
be rational.  
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 Now, establishing what credence distribution one should have over the number of correlated agents                           
facing decision problems of this kind, and their degree of correlation, is a thorny empirical matter over                                 
which there will be reasonable disagreement. Yet we believe that the numbers provided here are                             
conservative, and that it would certainly not be unreasonable for someone to have such beliefs in light                                 
of the vast number of people that could exist in the future.    18 19
 
This establishes that if you are a morally motivated and altruistic agent, you should one-box in ​Moral                                 
Newcomb even if you have significantly higher credence in causal than evidential decision theory. But                             
earlier, we claimed that there is nothing special about the ​Moral Newcomb ​case, and that our reasoning                                 
therefore supports the following more general conclusion: 
18 Moreover, if you object to the argument on empirical grounds alone, you still have to accept the surprising implication                                       
that beliefs about distant future agents are relevant for how you should act under decision-theoretic uncertainty.  
19 ​You might object that perhaps there are also anti-correlated decision makers out there, who tend to one-box when you                                      
two box. If there are as many anti-correlated decision-makers as there correlated ones, this would effectively cancel things                                   
out for EDT. If there are sufficiently many more anti-correlated than correlated ones, EDT would recommend two-boxing                                 
rather than one-boxing. Our argument assumes that there are many more correlated decision-makers than there are                               
anti-correlated ones. But unless you have some particular reason to think that you are special, this seems like a standard                                       
inductive inference. Finally, if you remain unconvinced of the claim that there are more correlated than anti-correlated                                 
decision makers, you shouldn’t believe that there are equally many decision makers of both types, but rather that there are                                       
many more anti-correlated ones. After all, it would be a rather striking coincidence if the two types of decision makers were                                         
evenly balanced. But if there are more anti-correlated than correlated decision-makers, then our argument would support                               
the different but similarly startling conclusion that even if you’re virtually certain of EDT, you should nevertheless ​two-box                                   
in the ​Moral Newcomb​ case. 
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 In general, and across a wide variety of decision contexts, if you are a morally                             
motivated and altruistic agent, and are uncertain between EDT and CDT, you should                         
typically act in line with the former even if you have significantly higher credence in                             
the latter. 
 
Is this more general claim correct? Or could it be that, although the Wager works in the ​Moral                                   
Newcomb ​case, there are other cases in which EDT and CDT come apart, where hedging under                               
decision-theoretic uncertainty doesn’t lead an altruistic agent to choose the option recommended by                         
EDT? Recall that what is driving our argument is the claim that your decision is correlated with the                                   
decisions of other agents. This means that your decision to perform an action provides evidence that                               
correlated agents will also perform that action. Moreover, if a correlated agent’s decision to perform                             
that action provides evidence that some desirable outcome will obtain, then your decision also                           
provides evidence that that outcome will obtain.  
 
In general, the existence of correlated agents will affect the stakes for EDT, but not for CDT. Now, as                                     
we saw in the ​Evil Twin ​case, it is possible to construct cases in which such correlations have the effect                                       
of ​decreasing the stakes for EDT. If the decrease is sufficiently large, the wager will run in the opposite                                     
direction: even if one has significantly higher credence in EDT than in CDT, one should nevertheless                               
act in accordance with the latter. However, we contend that such cases are few and far between. In the                                     
Evil Twin case, you are only correlated with one other agent who faces a problem with lower stakes,                                   
and whose decision will partially cancel out (by donating to an anti-charity) the good you achieve                               
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through your own decision (by donating to a charity). But once we take into account the vast number                                   
of people who may exist in the future, it’s overwhelmingly likely that whenever your decision is                               
correlated with one person’s decision, it will also be correlated with very many other people’s                             
decisions. It would therefore be a striking coincidence if the effect of these correlations would be to                                 
lower the stakes for EDT. If you have sufficiently many evil twins (or evil ​n​-tuplets), the stakes will be                                     
higher for EDT than CDT (although now EDT will also recommend two-boxing). If you have just                               
one good twin (and no evil twins), the stakes will also be higher for EDT. In general, once we take into                                         
account that there will be very many correlated agents, the only case in which the stakes will be lower                                     
for EDT is when (i) either the degrees of correlation or the “isolated” stakes faced by correlated agents                                   
are sufficiently low, and (ii) performing the action that EDT would have recommended in the absence                               
of correlated agents provides evidence that these agents will partially cancel out the good you achieve                               
through your own decision (in the same sense that your evil twin partially cancels out the good you                                   
achieve through one-boxing).  
 
What if one believes that anti-correlated agents vastly outnumber correlated ones? If one believes this                             
in the ​Moral Newcomb case, the conclusion of our argument is that one should two-box rather than                                 
one-box. However, this does not constitute a counterexample to our claim that a morally motivated                             
and altruistic agent should generally act in line with EDT even if she has significantly higher credence                                 
in CDT. To see this, note that even if the agent were certain of EDT, she would still two-box rather                                       
than one-box. Rather than being a counterexample, this is simply a case in which the agent’s belief that                                   
there are many more anti-correlated than correlated agents (together with the assumption that she is                             
altruistic and morally motivated) imply that EDT recommends a different option than what one                           
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might naïvely expect. What’s more, the stakes are again higher for EDT than they are for CDT, so in                                     
this sense it’s still EDT that is driving the decision.  20
 
In summary, the existence of correlated decision-makers will affect the stakes for EDT but not for                               
CDT. We have argued on empirical grounds that it’s reasonable to believe that there are sufficiently                               
many such correlated decision-makers so as to make hedging by following the recommendation of                           
EDT rational. The empirical argument was based on the assumption that the universe is finite. So let’s                                 




If, as many of our best cosmological theories imply, the universe is infinite, and every physically                               
possible configuration of matter is realised in infinitely many regions of spacetime, there will clearly be                               
sufficiently many correlated agents. Indeed, there will be infinitely many identical copies of you who                             21
are facing the same decision situation. So you might think that, if anything, the argument for the                                 
Wager becomes stronger if the universe is infinite. But the infinite case gives rise to a host of further                                     
complications, and we need to introduce additional principles to be able to compare worlds that                             
contain infinite amounts of value, or to be able to compare actions in such worlds. We will not be able                                       
20 If one believes that there are equally many correlated and anti-correlated agents (counting oneself among the correlated                                   
ones), then EDT will be indifferent between the two options, and one’s decision will therefore be driven by CDT. But                                       
such symmetry should be regarded as extremely unlikely.  
21 See  Garriga and Vilenkin (2001) and Knobe, Olum and Vilenkin (2006)  for discussion of these cosmological theories. 
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to undertake a complete survey of proposed principles so, instead, we will merely note that the                               
argument goes through on at least one leading account of infinite ethics. 
 
Our first problem: In infinite worlds, can we even say that EDT recommends one-boxing over                             
two-boxing in ​Moral Newcomb​? If you one-box, you obtain strong evidence that infinitely many other                             
agents will receive ten doses of the cure. But if you two-box, you obtain strong evidence that infinitely                                   
many other agents will receive one dose of the cure. In standard cardinal arithmetic, the total number                                 
of doses will be the same in both cases, thereby seemingly implying that EDT will be indifferent                                 
between the two actions. But that seems like the wrong conclusion. So we should invoke additional                               
principles that allow us to discriminate between different infinite worlds.  
 
To keep things simple, let us for the moment only consider agents who are perfect duplicates of you,                                   
and let us compare two worlds: in ​w​1​, you all one-box and save ten lives each, and in ​w​2​, you all                                         
two-box and and save one life each. We will assume that these two worlds are perfectly alike in all other                                       
respects. That is, these two worlds share all of the same locations, and for all locations except those                                   
corresponding to lives that are saved in one world but not in the other, the value at that location is the                                         
same in both worlds. To solve the first problem, we need an account which allows us to say that ​w​1 is                                         
better than ​w​2​. One such account is that of Vallentyne and Kagan (1997). Let ​R​1​, ​R​2​, ​R​3​, … be a                                       
sequence of larger and larger spacetime regions that grow without bound, centred on the location in                               




For any worlds ​w​1 and ​w​2​, if there is some ​n such that for any ​m > ​n​, the value in region                                           
R​m of ​w​1 is greater than the value in region ​R​m of ​w​2​, then the value of ​w​1 is greater than                                         
that of ​w​2​.  22
 
If we assume that there is some ​n such that for any ​m > n​, the region R​m contains more correlated than                                           
anti-correlated agents, it follows that ​w​1 is better than ​w​2​. This means that although anti-correlated                             
agents may outnumber correlated ones in some finite regions, we can always find larger regions that                               
contain them where the reverse is true. If we are happy to assume that there are more correlated than                                     
anti-correlated agents in a finite universe, we should also be happy to make this further assumption in                                 
the infinite case. So the ​Catching Up principle allows us to make sense of the idea that ​w​1 is better than                                         
w​2​, and therefore that EDT recommends one-boxing in ​Moral  Newcomb​.  
 
The second problem is to make sense of the claim that the decision in ​Moral Newcomb is much higher                                     
stakes for EDT than it is for CDT, and that you should therefore hedge under decision-theoretic                               
uncertainty. That is, we need to be able to say that even if your credence in CDT is significantly                                     
higher, you should nevertheless follow the recommendation of EDT. On its own, ​Catching Up ​doesn’t                             
allow us to say this, because it only tells us how to compare ​worlds that contain potentially infinite                                   
amounts of value. But what we need is a way of comparing ​actions in such worlds. In light of this,                                       
22 ​This is roughly equivalent to the SBI2 proposal of Vallentyne and Kagan (1997:14), skipping over some technical details.                                    
This proposal assumes that it makes sense to speak of the same location in the two worlds being compared. In the present                                           
case, this assumption will be satisfied.  
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Arntzenius (2014) suggests a modification of the view. His proposal is simple: just replace talk of value                                 
in a region with talk of ​expected value​ in a region. 
 
Expected Catching Up 
For any actions ​A and ​B​, if there is some ​n such that for any ​m > ​n​, the expected value                                         
of ​A in region ​R​m is greater than the expected value of ​B in region ​R​m​, then ​A is better                                       
than ​B​. 
 
In order to apply this to the case at hand, let’s suppose for the moment that our approach to                                     
decision-theoretic uncertainty is to maximise meta expected value, where the meta expected value of an                             
action ​A is given as For EDT, the stakes will          EV (A) EEV (A)P (EDT ) EV (A)P (CDT ).M =  + C            
keep growing without bound as we consider larger and larger regions. By contrast, for CDT the stakes                                 
will remain the same in any finite region. Therefore, we will be able to find an ​n such that for any ​m ​>                                             
n​, the meta expected value in ​R​m of one-boxing is greater than that of two-boxing, and thereby                                 
conclude that one-boxing is rational. But importantly, this conclusion does not depend on the                           
assumption that maximising meta expected value is the appropriate way to behave under                         
decision-theoretic uncertainty. For any non-zero credence in EDT and any view about how large the                             
difference in stakes must be in order for hedging to be rational given that credence, we will always be                                     
able to find a region ​R​n such that for any ​m > n​, the difference in stakes between EDT and CDT is                                           
sufficiently large to justify one-boxing. Note, in addition, that this also means that we don’t have to                                 
rely on any possibly contentious claims about how to do intertheoretic comparisons between EDT                           
31 
and CDT. As long as V​CDT = ​k​V​EDT + ​m for some finite ​k and ​m​, it follows that we will be able to find                                                 
an appropriate region ​R​n​. 
 
So if ​Expected Catching Up is correct, the Wager goes through in infinite worlds as well. And some                                   
other accounts, such as Bostrom’s (2011) “hyperreal” approach, would also endorse the Wager.                         23
Roughly speaking, by representing the value of infinite worlds using hyperreal numbers, we are able to                               
say that the world in which all correlated agents receive ten doses of the cure is better than the world in                                         
which they only receive one dose of the cure, even though both worlds contain infinite amounts of                                 
value. And given that hyperreal numbers can be straightforwardly multiplied with probabilities, this                         
approach allows us to make sense of the claim that the stakes are higher for EDT than for CDT.  24
 
Of course, however, infinite ethics is a fiendish topic, and there is no consensus on what the right view                                     




For any worlds ​w​1 and ​w​2 that contain exactly the same individuals, if every individual                             
has at least as much welfare in ​w​1 as she does in ​w​2​, then ​w​1 is at least as good as ​w​2​. If in                                               
23 Another class of theories that will also endorse the Wager are those that discount value by distance, at least provided that                                           
the discount rate is not steep enough to lower the stakes for EDT to the point where hedging no longer favours one-boxing,                                           
although it’s fair to say that such theories are not regarded as leading contenders.  
24 However, see Arntzenius (2014:49–52) for discussion of some difficulties for the hyperreal approach. 
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addition at least one individual has more welfare in ​w​1 than in ​w​2​, then ​w​1 is better than                                   
w​2​. 
 
To see this, assume for simplicity that either all correlated agents save ten lives each and all                                 
anti-correlated agents save one life each, or vice versa. You can either one-box or two-box. This gives us                                   
four worlds: one in which you and all correlated agents one-box, one in which you one-box but your                                   
correlated agents two-box, and so forth. We can now consider permutations of these worlds that                             
contain exactly the same individuals at exactly the same welfare levels, except that all people saved by                                 
anti-correlated agents are closer to you in spacetime than any of the people saved by correlated agents.                                 
With respect to these permuted worlds, ​Expected Catching Up implies that two-boxing has greater                           
expected value than one-boxing. In both cases, we calculate expected value by assigning the same                             
probability to a world and its permutation, so if one-boxing has greater expected value in one case but                                   
not the other, it follows that not all permuted worlds are equally as good as the worlds they permute.                                     
But this is precisely what ​Pareto ​rules out. 
 
However, as Askell (2018) shows, if one endorses ​Pareto ​and some other very plausible assumptions,                             
one will have to accept that there is widespread incomparability between infinite worlds. So we can                               
state our conclusion, with respect to the infinite case, in a restricted form: ​if one wishes to avoid                                   






We have argued that an altruistic and morally motivated agent who is uncertain between CDT and                               
EDT (or some other non-causal decision theory like FDT) should in general act in accordance with the                                 
latter, even if she has greater credence in the former. To arrive at this conclusion, we first argued that it                                       
is rational to hedge in the face of decision-theoretic uncertainty. That is, if the stakes are much higher                                   
for one theory than another, and the credences assigned to the two theories aren’t very different, then                                 
one should act in accordance with the higher-stakes theory. In order to say whether the stakes are                                 
higher for one theory rather than another, we need an account of intertheoretic value comparisons.                             
We argued that such comparisons should be made by letting EDT and CDT have the same value                                 
function over outcomes. We noted that, given the assumption of altruism, the existence of correlated                             
decision-makers will affect the stakes for EDT but not for CDT. Finally, we argued that for reasonable                                 
credence distributions over EDT and CDT, there will be sufficiently many correlated decision-makers                         
so as to make it rational in general to follow the recommendation of EDT. In the finite case, we                                     
appealed to estimates about how many people will exist in the future. In the infinite case, there is                                   
guaranteed to be sufficiently many correlated agents, but further complications arise. We showed that                           
on one natural way of solving these, the argument still goes through. If we are altruistic and morally                                   




25 ​MacAskill came up with the central argument. Vallinder further developed this argument and took the lead in writing                                    
the paper. Oesterheld, Shulman, and Treutlein (listed in alphabetical order) had all independently discovered the same                               
argument. All coauthors contributed extensive comments and suggestions in the process of writing the paper. 
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